A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts

Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The principal observes only the output levels of the agents. It is shown that in the absence of a common shock, using optimal independent contracts dominates using the optimal tournament. Conversely, if the distribution of the common shock is sufficiently diffuse, using the optimal tournament dominates using optimal independent contracts. Finally, it is shown that for a sufficiently large number of agents, a principal who cannot observe the common shock but uses the optimal tournament, does as well as one who can observe the shock and uses independent contracts.

The Price of Land and the Process of Expropriation

This paper applies a game theoretic model to situations in which the Dutch government expropriates land from some farmers in order to create a new public project. The model is a version of a finite period bargaining model with asymmetric information and one-sided offers. It is shown that the model can explain some casual observations as the fact that usually, but not always, the government and the farmers settle by agreement

Evaluation Research and Institutional Pressures: Challenges in Public-Nonprofit Contracting

This article examines the connection between program evaluation research and decision-making by public managers. Drawing on neo-institutional theory, a framework is presented for diagnosing the pressures and conditions that lead alternatively toward or away the rational use of evaluation research. Three cases of public-nonprofit contracting for the delivery of major programs are presented to clarify the way coercive, mimetic, and normative pressures interfere with a sound connection being made between research and implementation. The article concludes by considering how public managers can respond to the isomorphic pressures in their environment that make it hard to act on data relating to program performance.This publication is Hauser Center Working Paper No. 23. The Hauser Center Working Paper Series was launched during the summer of 2000. The Series enables the Hauser Center to share with a broad audience important works-in-progress written by Hauser Center scholars and researchers

Simple models for rope substructure mechanics: Application to electro-mechanical lifts

Mechanical systems modelled as rigid mass elements connected by tensioned slender structural members such as ropes and cables represent quite common substructures used in lift engineering and hoisting applications. Special interest is devoted by engineers and researchers to the vibratory response of such systems for optimum performance and durability. This paper presents simplified models that can be employed to determine the natural frequencies of systems having substructures of two rigid masses constrained by tensioned rope/cable elements. The exact solution for free un-damped longitudinal displacement response is discussed in the context of simple two-degree-of-freedom models. The results are compared and the influence of characteristics parameters such as the ratio of the average mass of the two rigid masses with respect to the rope mass and the deviation ratio of the two rigid masses with respect to the average mass is analyzed. This analysis gives criteria for the application of such simplified models in complex elevator and hoisting system configurations